




The fundamental basis for the One Health concept is rooted in the interconnectedness of 
animal, human, and environmental health. Because of these complex linkages, supporters of One 
Health advocate that effective solutions to public health challenges require multi-disciplinary 
communication, collaboration, and coordination.  
The One Health concept dates back to the mid-19
th
 century to Rudolph Virchow who 
understood the value of incorporating medicine and veterinary medicine into public health. He 
and other prominent scientists of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century championed the One Health 
approach, leading to scientific and medical breakthroughs that still benefit us today. After a 
quiescent period, the One Health concept underwent a rebirth as increasingly more frequent 
infectious disease outbreak events [i.e., severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian 
influenza, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), and West Nile virus] captured global 
attention and revealed vulnerabilities in preparedness and response methods to combat zoonotic 
and emerging infectious diseases. In the early 21
st
 century, the One Health approach gained a 
foothold in the public health realm as a viable and feasible system to address challenges at the 
human-animal-environment interface.  
In 2014, when Ebola virus disease struck the United States (US), the public looked 
towards government agencies and health organizations to respond swiftly and appropriately. 
From the animal health perspective, United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) responded 
by activating a departmental-level One Health task force to coordinate multi-agency response 
activities across various public health disciplines. The One Health approach is reviewed and 
evaluated for the feasibility of incorporating human, animal, and environmental health at the 
federal level; the degree of integration across multiple disciplines; and the ability of the response 
to improve and benefit overall health outcomes. The approach proved to be an effective 
mechanism for dealing with animal health-related components and provided valuable lessons 
learned for improving response mechanisms for future One Health events. With continued 
implementation and integration, the One Health approach is an attainable and beneficial method 
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One Health Defined 
The One Health concept has many varied definitions all centered around the common 
idea that human, animal, and environmental health are intricately linked and multidisciplinary, 
collaborative efforts are necessary to find effective public health interventions and preventive 
strategies (Atlas, 2013; Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013; Monath, Kahn, & Kaplan, 2010). The American 
Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) defines One Health as “the collaborative efforts of 
multiple disciplines working locally, nationally, and globally to attain optimal health for people, 
animals, and our environment” (AVMA, 2015, para. 1). The European Union defines One Health 
as: 
The improvement of health and well-being through (i) the prevention of risks and the 
mitigation of effects of crises that originate at the interface between humans, animals and 
their various environments, and (ii) promoting a cross-sectoral, collaborative, ‘whole of 
society’ approach to health hazards, as a systemic change of perspective in the 
management of risks. (Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013, p. 33)  
Similarly, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) adopts a broad, 
rather flexible definition while other international agencies such as the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) adhere to a more 
restricted definition that focuses primarily on zoonotic threats (Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013).  
The One Health approach seeks to bring together professionals from various disciplines 
including veterinarians, physicians, agricultural scientists, anthropologists, economists, 
educators, engineers, entomologists, epidemiologists, hydrologists, microbiologists, nutritionists, 
environmentalists, public health professionals, sociologists, and wildlife specialists (Gibbs & 
Gibbs, 2013; Mazet et al., 2009). Traditionally, these disciplines have worked in isolation within 
specialized “silos” focused on individual components of disease outbreak events. The One 
Health approach seeks to remove disciplinary boundaries and form cross-sectoral alliances to 
draw upon a wider pool of knowledge networks and resources systems. The One Health 
approach is built upon the premise that a holistic approach to health policies and interventions 
yields a larger health benefit than individually addressing disease components in isolation (Mazet 
et al., 2009).  
Purpose of Paper 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the evolution of the One Health 
concept as a viable systems thinking strategy to respond to zoonotic and emerging infectious 
diseases that occur at the human-animal-environment interface. Within USDA, the One Health 
approach was used to respond to the 2014 Ebola outbreak in the United States. The Ebola 






The Historical Evolution of One Health 
The One Health concept is not a new idea but rather one that has evolved over the past 
150 years and only recently, in the past decade or so, has experienced a renaissance among 
scientists and health professionals in response to several emerging disease events (i.e., West Nile 
Virus, H5N1 avian influenza, SARS, and others) that have threatened human and animal health 
(Cardiff, Ward, & Barthold, 2008; Dhama et al., 2013; Gibbs, 2014). Rudolph Virchow (1821-
1902), a German pathologist and considered to be the father of comparative medicine, cellular 
biology, and veterinary pathology, launched the One Health concept in the 19
th
 century (Monath 
et al., 2010; Saunders, 2000). He is quoted as saying, “between animal and human medicine 
there are no dividing lines- nor should there be. The object is different but the experience 
obtained constitutes the basis of all medicine” (Osburn, Scott, & Gibbs, 2009, p. 481). In an era 
the pre-dates the universal acceptance of germ theory, he coined the term “zoonosis” to describe 
the infectious disease links between animal and human health (Cardiff et al., 2008; Monath et al., 
2010). Virchow determined the life cycle of the nematode Trichinella spiralis, a parasitic 
roundworm that can infect humans through the ingestion of improperly cooked meat, particularly 
pork. He discovered that the circular structures often seen in porcine muscle tissue were not 
normal variations in the meat but rather the larvae of T. spiralis (Saunders, 2000). He used this 
information to develop practical applications for low power microscopic and macroscopic 
examination of pork meat for the detection of parasites in abattoirs and, through his involvement 
in parliamentary politics, he was instrumental in bringing veterinarians into sanitary abattoirs to 
inspect meat for human consumption as a public health protective measure. These practices were 




Sir William Osler (1849-1919), a Canadian physician and a student of Virchow’s, was 
the first to coin the term “One Medicine” (this term would later evolve into “One Health”) in the 
English language literature and to bring the idea of integrated medicine to North America 
(Cardiff et al., 2008; Osburn et al., 2009; Zinsstag, Schelling, Waltner-Toews, & Tanner, 2011). 
He is considered to be a founding father of modern medicine and the father of veterinary 
pathology in North America. He was influenced by Virchow’s teachings on the importance of 
including veterinarians and farmers in public health and, like Virchow, many of the activities that 
he pursued professionally sought to connect medicine and veterinary medicine with each other 
(Monath et al., 2010; Saunders, 2000).  
Several other 19
th
 century scientists, physicians and veterinarians were important early 
pioneers of the One Health concept with significant scientific contributions to both human and 
animal health. Louis Pasteur (1822-1895) did extensive research into vaccines, including pre-
exposure rabies vaccination of canines and post-exposure vaccination in humans. Robert Koch 
(1843-1910) studied the etiology of tuberculosis in both cattle and humans, finding a causal 
relationship between infection by a specific bacterium and clinical disease (Atlas, 2013). Daniel 
E. Salmon (1850-1914), for whom the Salmonella genus of bacteria was named, established the 
veterinary division within the USDA called the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI). While at BAI, 
Salmon hired and worked with several prominent physicians including Theobald Smith (1859-
                                                          
1
 In the US, federal meat inspection began in 1890 within the meat inspection division of the Bureau of Animal 
Industry but only for pork carcasses exported to Germany. It wasn’t until the early part of the 20
th
 century that meat 
inspection and sanitary abattoirs became the norm for domestic meat production through legislative action and 
oversight by federally-employed veterinarians and meat inspectors.  
 
1934) who, together with Salmon, discovered that heat-destroyed pathogens could immunize 
humans and animals against live pathogens. This monumental discovery led to the development 
of the typhus vaccine and Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine (Kahn, Kaplan, & Monath, 2009; Monath et 
al., 2010). Smith and veterinarian Frederick L. Kilborne (1858-1936) discovered that Babesiosis 
in cattle was a vector-borne disease transmitted by ticks; their work was thought to be the 
foundational work for Walter Reed’s discovery that yellow fever was a vector-borne disease 
transmitted by mosquitoes. John McFadyean (1853-1941), both a veterinary and medical doctor 
and considered by many as the founder of veterinary research, linked bovine tuberculosis in milk 
and milk products to human tuberculosis cases, paving the way for widespread acceptance of 
pasteurization of milk as a key public health measure in the prevention of milk-borne pathogens 
(Holsinger, Rajkowski, & Stabel, 1997; Kahn et al., 2009; Monath et al., 2010).  
During most of the 20
th
 century, the collaborative spirit between veterinarians and 
physicians waned as veterinary medicine shifted from its origins in food animals and horses to 
companion animals and both professions segregated into specialized medicine and intellectual 
silos (Atlas, 2013; Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013; Zinsstag et al., 2011). However, the One Health 
concept and the term “One Medicine” resurfaced with veterinary epidemiologist and 
parasitologist Calvin Schwabe (1927-2006) and his 1984 book Veterinary Medicine and Human 
Health (Monath et al., 2010; Osburn et al., 2009). Known as the founder of veterinary 
epidemiology, Schwabe was a renowned expert on zoonotic diseases. Through his work with 
Dinka pastoralists in Sudan, Schwabe emphasized the interdependence of animals and animal 
products to human health and public well-being (Osburn et al., 2009; Zinsstag et al., 2011). The 
One Health concept was further championed by veterinarian James H. Steele (1913-2013). 
Known as the father of veterinary public health and the founder of the veterinary public health 
division at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Steele tirelessly promoted the 
One Health concept throughout his more than 70 year career (referred by Steele as “One World, 
One Medicine, One Health”). It was Steele and his followers that paved the way for taking the 
vision and ideas of the One Health concept and implementing them into public health and 
disease control programs that were operationalized within international organizations, academia, 
and various levels of the government framework (Monath et al., 2010).  
The Resurgence of One Health in the 21
st
 Century 
Early in the 21
st
 century, several global disease events [i.e., West Nile Virus, H5N1 avian 
influenza, SARS, Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, monkeypox, BSE, and Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus (HIV) decades previously] highlighted the need for cross-sectoral collaboration and 
generated a heightened interest among scientists and health professionals to gain a deeper 
understanding of the complex, interconnectedness of emerging zoonotic diseases and human, 
animal, and environmental health (Cardiff et al., 2008; Gibbs, 2014). In 2004, the Wildlife 
Conservation Society organized a conference on One World-One Health and formally extended 
the One Health concept to include environmental health (including wildlife and their ecosystems) 
(Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013). Collaborators at the conference formulated 12 recommendations called 
the Manhattan Principles (link) for establishing a more holistic approach to addressing emerging 
pandemic and epizootic diseases that threaten human, animal, and environmental health (Gibbs 
& Gibbs, 2013; One Health One World, 2009). In 2007, both the American Medical Association 
(AMA) and the AVMA passed resolutions to promote multidisciplinary collaborations between 
human and animal health (Cardiff et al., 2008; Dhama et al., 2013; Osburn et al., 2009). 
Following these commitments, the One Health Commission and the One Health Initiative were 
independently launched as means to conceptualize One Health ideas and principles into 
actionable strategic frameworks for collaboration and communication among health science 
professions, governmental agencies, and health organizations (Atlas, 2013; Gibbs, 2014; One 
Health Commission, 2015; One Health Initiative, 2015; Osburn et al., 2009). Other international 
agencies including FAO, WHO, and OIE developed their own guiding principles for responding 
to disease risks at the human-animal-environment interface. In 2009, the CDC established the 
One Health Office in close partnership with the USDA with a mission to “facilitate, sponsor and 
coordinate research and program activities that seek to attain optimal health for people and 
animals through an integrated approach considering the interrelatedness among humans, animals, 
and the environment in which they live” (CDC, 2013, para 1). In 2011, the first international One 
Health Congress and the first One Health Conference were held (Atlas, 2013; Gibbs, 2014).  
Over the past decade, the nomenclature shifted from “One Medicine” to “One Health” to 
embrace a broader umbrella of concepts, including non-infectious disease applications such as 
the human-animal bond, comparative medicine research for cancer treatment in canines and 
humans, and toxic or hazardous exposure in humans and animals (Gibbs, 2014; One Health 
Initiative, 2015; Zinsstag et al., 2011; Zinsstag, Schelling, Wyss, & Mahamat, 2005). Today, the 
rapid expansion of the One Health concept has led to global acceptance of the One Health 
approach as a viable approach for health science professionals, government agencies, academia, 
and organizations.  
The Rising Need for the One Health Approach 
Globally, several socio-economic, demographic, and environmental factors have 
significantly changed, causing an upsurge in emerging infectious diseases. Rapid population 
growth has forced human populations to encroach upon wildlife habitats, increasing the direct 
contact people have with wild animals and the diseases they carry (Osburn et al., 2009). 
Population growth has also increased worldwide demand for animal protein, pushing the need for 
increased efficiency of livestock and farm fishing. Anthropogenic environmental changes such as 
deforestation or agricultural intensification force wildlife reservoirs for zoonotic diseases into 
closer proximity to humans (Kahn, Kaplan, & Steele, 2007). Globalization of the food supply, 
international trade of animals and agricultural products, and the global movement of people all 
contribute to the rapid spread and dissemination of disease pathogens to previously unaffected 
regions and populations (Dhama et al., 2013; Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013). Climate change has 
contributed to vector-borne diseases appearing in geographic ranges previously believed to be 
unfit for disease maintenance (Dhama et al., 2013; Osburn et al., 2009). Other reasons such as 
ecotourism, water scarcity, civil unrest, political instability, and the breakdown of public health 
systems in developing countries have all impacted human interactions at the human-animal-
environment interface (Dhama et al., 2013). 
Because of these changes, there has been a significant increase in the prevalence of 
emerging infectious diseases in the past three decades. Approximately 60% of emerging 
infectious diseases in humans are caused by transmission of an infectious agent from animals; 
75% of these diseases originate in wildlife. In particular, the rise in viral diseases has focused the 
One Health approach on animal reservoirs, particularly wildlife, as the source for epidemic 
disease in humans. Viral mutation or reassortment allows host preferences to expand beyond the 
primary specie(s), causing spillover events, particularly at porous regions between people and 
wildlife (Daszak et al., 2013; Day, 2011; Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013). Zoonotic disease outbreak 
events such as BSE, SARS, H5N1 and H1N1 influenzas, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome 
(MERS) and most recently, Ebola, have captured global attention and uncovered vulnerabilities 
in the preparedness and response of the global community to combat emerging infectious 
diseases. Additionally, it has placed public health systems under close scrutiny for the 
effectiveness of their surveillance, assessment, and treatment programs (Azhar et al., 2014; 
Dhama et al., 2013).  
  
CHAPTER III 
ONE HEALTH AND EBOLA VIRUS DISEASE (EVD) 
  
There is mounting evidence for the necessity and value of multidisciplinary approaches to 
public health events that span across humans and animals. The One Health approach has been 
recognized as an important element of disease control and prevention by international agencies 
and organizations (Rabinowitz et al., 2013). While proof-of-concept evidence and large, 
controlled studies to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of the One Health approach are 
somewhat lacking in the literature, several successful case studies have shown that a One Health 
approach results in an increased health benefit for both humans and animals (Daszak et al., 2013; 
Mazet et al., 2009; Middleton et al., 2014; Rabinowitz et al., 2013; Rubin, Dunham, & Sleeman, 
2014). The recent 2014 Ebola outbreak in the US, an extension from the on-going outbreak in 
West Africa, is an example of the One Health concept in action. The One Health approach is 
quite fitting for the EVD outbreak as the origins of the first outbreak in 1976 are rooted in a 
multi-disciplinary investigation. Virologists Frederick A. Murphy, a veterinarian, and Karl M. 
Johnson, a physician, worked closely together, along with others, to uncover the root cause of the 
initial outbreak of EVD (Johnson, Lange, Webb, & Murphy, 1977).  
To further examine the effectiveness of the One Health approach, a review of the One 
Health response to EVD from the animal health perspective at the federal agency level is 
presented. The response will be evaluated on the feasibility of incorporating human, animal, and 
environmental health at the federal agency level; the degree of integration across multiple 
disciplines; and the ability of the response to improve and benefit overall health outcomes 
(Rabinowitz et al., 2013). Successes and gaps are identified and recommendations for 
strengthening the One Health approach are provided. It should be noted that this evaluation is 
only considering the USDA component of the US government EVD response. A complete 
evaluation of the US government response is outside the scope of this paper. 
EVD in Humans 
Ebola virus disease (EVD), previously known as Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever is a serious, 
often deadly disease caused by viruses in the family Filoviridae, genus Ebolavirus. Ebolaviruses 
are enveloped RNA viruses related to Marburg virus. There are five strains within the genus 
Ebolavirus: Zaire ebolavirus, Sudan ebolavirus, Tai forest ebolavirus (formerly Ivory Coast 
ebolavirus), Bundibugyo ebolavirus, and Reston ebolavirus. With the exception of Reston 
ebolavirus, all can cause disease in humans. Zaire ebolavirus (referred to as Ebola) has caused 
several large epidemics in Africa and it is the etiologic agent responsible for the current outbreak 
in West Africa (Ascenzi et al., 2008; CDC, 2014a, 2014b; WHO, 2014a). 
EVD was first discovered in 1976 near the Ebola River in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Between 1976 and 2013, there were approximately 20 outbreaks of EVD in East and 
Central Africa; most of these outbreaks were attributed to Zaire ebolavirus. These outbreaks 
were characterized by small clusters of cases, typically 500 or less, in secluded, rural locations 
(Brown, Arkell, & Rokadiya, 2015; Groseth, Feldmann, & Strong, 2007). In 2014, an Ebola 
outbreak emerged in several countries in West Africa. Phylogenetic comparisons of genomes 
from current and previous outbreaks suggest that the virus diverged from Central African 
lineages into West Africa around 2004 (Gire et al., 2014). The West African outbreak is believed 
to have begun in December 2013 from Guéckédou, a remote forested area in Guinea. In the early 
months of 2014, it quickly spread to the neighboring countries of Liberia and Sierra Leone 
(Brown et al., 2015). The WHO was officially notified in March 2014 and by August 2014, the 
WHO had declared the epidemic to be a “public health emergency of international concern” 
(WHO, 2014a, p. 1481). As of March 22, 2015, there have been 24,907 cases and 10,326 deaths 
from EVD. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone continue to be the most-affected countries by the 
outbreak. Six countries—Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the US—have 
reported a case or cases imported from a disease-stricken country (WHO, 2015) and numerous 
cases, primarily health care workers, have been treated across Western Europe. The on-going 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa is by far the largest recorded EVD outbreak to date (Brown et al., 
2015).  
In humans, EVD has an incubation period of 2-21 days (average 8-10 days). Symptoms 
include fever, muscle aches, fatigue, vomiting, diarrhea, stomach pain, maculopapular rash, and 
unexplained bleeding (Ascenzi et al., 2008; CDC, 2014b; Groseth et al., 2007; WHO, 2014b). 
Human-to-human transmission occurs through direct contact with blood or bodily fluids of a 
clinically ill person or through contact with objects contaminated with the virus. In fatal cases, 
death usually occurs 6 to 16 days after the onset of clinical signs from multi-organ failure and 
shock. For EVD, the overall case fatality can range from 60 - 90%; the case fatality rate for the 
current outbreak in West Africa is 70.8% (WHO, 2014a). There are currently no approved 
therapeutics or vaccines; treatment consists primarily of supportive care.  
EVD and the Natural Wildlife Reservoir 
EVD is a zoonotic disease that can be transmitted to humans through direct contact with 
live or dead animals. Bats, both fruit-eaters and insectivores, are the suspected, yet unconfirmed, 
wildlife reservoir. Several wildlife species have been shown to be infected by EVD, both 
naturally and experimentally, including bats, nonhuman primates, duikers, mice, rats, and 
shrews. Ebola has been blamed for several die-off events in gorillas and chimpanzees in Central 
Africa (Bermejo et al., 2006). Nonhuman primates succumb to EVD in a similar manner as 
humans and, thus, are not considered a classical reservoir species (Groseth et al., 2007). Morvan 
et al. (1999) isolated Zaire ebolavirus RNA from small rodents, suggesting mice, rats, and 
shrews as possible reservoirs. However, these findings have not been confirmed nor replicated 
(Groseth et al., 2007; Morvan et al., 1999). In recent years, mounting evidence points to bats as 
the most plausible reservoir hosts (Leroy et al., 2005; Olival & Hayman, 2014; Saez et al., 2014; 
Swanepoel et al., 1996). Bats have been shown to be asymptomatic carriers of Zaire ebolavirus 
antibodies (IgG) in serum samples and to have viral RNA in liver and spleen samples. 
Additionally, circulating Zaire ebolavirus antibodies IgG antibodies have been found in 
numerous bat populations, both in EVD endemic and non-endemic regions (Leroy et al., 2005). 
Based on current findings, bats are thought to be the reservoir host for Ebola viruses although 
other hosts may exist. Further research is needed to confirm the natural reservoir host(s). 
EVD in Domesticated Animal Species 
In domesticated species, dogs and pigs can be infected by EVD. In dogs, Allela et al. 
(2005) performed a serological survey in highly infected areas of Gabon in the 2001-2002 
outbreak of Zaire ebolavirus. The study found evidence of Zaire ebolavirus antibodies in dogs 
though there was no evidence of clinical infection and virus was not detected in blood serum 
samples by viral polymerase chain reaction amplification. It remains unknown whether or not 
viral particles could be excreted in urine, feces, or saliva for a short period of time before virus 
clearance (Allela et al., 2005).  
Pigs can be experimentally infected with Zaire ebolavirus. In a study by Kobinger et al. 
(2011), the pigs developed clinical respiratory symptoms, some severe, and were able to transmit 
the virus to naïve pen mates through direct contact. In another experimental study, infected pigs 
were able to transmit Zaire ebolavirus to macaques through indirect contact. Macaques were 
housed in the same room as infected pigs in open, inaccessible cages. All the macaques became 
infected, suggesting that aerosol transmission or aerosolized droplets in the air or on fomites may 
be a transmission route. Transmission from pigs to non-human primates suggests that pigs, wild 
or domestic, may be natural (non-reservoir) hosts for Ebola viruses and may contribute to Ebola 
transmission to other species, including humans, during outbreak events (Kobinger et al., 2011; 
Weingartl et al., 2012; Weingartl, Nfon, & Kobinger, 2013). The epidemiological significance of 
livestock, in particular pigs, in human EVD outbreaks is largely unknown. Further research is 
needed. 
Pigs can also be infected with Reston ebolavirus, a strain that has not been shown to 
cause clinical disease in humans. Reston ebolavirus appears to result in asymptomatic infection 
in pigs. In 2008, Reston ebolavirus was isolated in the Philippines during a disease investigation 
in pigs. The pigs were co-infected with two other porcine viruses. Further studies found that 
Reston ebolavirus replicates subclinically in pigs; however, knowing the mutating nature of 
viruses, pigs could pose an unknown transmission risk to animals and people (Marsh et al., 
2011).  
EVD Transmissibility from Animals to Humans 
Outbreaks of Ebola are thought to commence through reservoir-to-human transmission. 
One hypothesis is that bats transmit Ebola virus to an amplifying host, likely a nonhuman 
primate or a human. High viral loads in the first amplifying host favors transmission to humans, 
usually through direct contact with bodily fluids. This can occur with human-to-human contact 
or through handling infected tissues, such as through hunting and butchering nonhuman primates 
or bats for bushmeat (Kobinger et al., 2011; Leroy et al., 2004). Genomic surveillance suggests 
that the 2014 outbreak originated from a single transmission event from the wildlife reservoir to 
humans followed by human-to-human transmission (Gire et al., 2014). The index case for the 
2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa can be traced to a 2-year-old Guinean child playing in a 
hollowed out tree that housed a colony of insectivorous bats. Anecdotal evidence provided by 
villagers reported children often played in and around the tree, catching and handling the bats 
(Saez et al., 2014). The exact origin of the 2014 outbreak cannot be confirmed; however, animal 
reservoirs are not thought to be contributing to the continuous spread of the West African 
epidemic. The epidemic is being perpetuated by human-to-human transmission (Gire et al., 
2014).  
EVD in the United States 
In the US, there have been 4 laboratory-confirmed cases of Ebola and one death. The first 
case of Ebola was confirmed on September 30, 2014 in a man who had traveled to Dallas, Texas 
from Liberia. The patient died on October 8. On October 10, a healthcare worker who provided 
care for the index case tested positive for Ebola. The healthcare worker owned a dog. On 
October 11, the dog was quarantined for 21 days. A second healthcare worker that provided care 
for the index case tested positive for Ebola on October 15. On October 23, 2014, a medical aid 
worker returning to New York from Guinea was diagnosed with Ebola. All three patients 
recovered and all contacts completed the 21-day monitoring period. The dog did not develop an 
antibody response to or clinical signs consistent with Ebola and was released after a 21-day 
quarantine (CDC, 2014a).  
Concurrent to the US outbreak, on October 6, 2014, Spain reported its first case of Ebola 
in a healthcare worker that had treated a patient repatriated from West Africa. The healthcare 
worker owned a dog. Despite public outcry and lack of scientific evidence linking human Ebola 
to dogs, the Spanish government euthanized the dog on October 8 due to exposure to Ebola and 
fear of contagion (Brat & Bjork, 2014; Brat & Neumann, 2014).  
  
CHAPTER IV 
ONE HEALTH APPROACH TO EVD: USDA ANIMAL HEALTH PERSPECTIVE 
 
Three culminating events triggered state and federal public health and animal health 
officials to come together to respond to and prepare for EVD in animals and humans: 1) the 
decision by the Spanish government to euthanize the dog in Spain; 2) the appearance of Ebola in 
the US; and 3) the uncertainty surrounding the role of dogs and pigs in the epidemiology of 
Ebola outbreaks. Immediately following the death of the dog in Spain, a meeting was held with 
several federal and state government agencies, including USDA and CDC, national health 
organizations such as the AVMA, and other relevant stakeholders. As a result of this meeting, 
the USDA One Health Joint Working Group
2
 formed a task force called the USDA Ebola 
Working Group (WG) whose primary function was to coordinate multi-agency response 
activities across animal and public health disciplines. The WG was composed of leaders and 
subject matter experts from various USDA departmental and agency levels, government liaisons 
to CDC, and national health organizations. The WG had three focus areas: animal health, 
including livestock, companion animal, and wildlife species; public health, including food safety 
and occupational safety; and information sharing and research development.  
In conjunction with CDC, Texas state animal and public health officials, and other 
relevant stakeholders, the first immediate need for the WG was to formulate the Canine 
Quarantine Protocol for the dog of the first healthcare worker. The protocol was successfully 
implemented; the dog underwent the 21-day quarantine and was released to the owner in early 
                                                          
2
 The USDA One Health Joint Working Group was established in 2009 to serve as a central point of coordination for 
discussions, reviews, and decisions regarding One Health issues. The Working Group consists of volunteers from 
relevant USDA agencies and offices with a core mission to raise awareness of One Health within the Department; to 
provide a forum for discussion One Health issues; and facilitate operational support and prioritization of tasks for 
One Health initiatives within USDA. 
November 2014. Subsequently, the WG collaborated on various EVD response activities 
including providing technical information on Ebola and animals for the CDC website and public 
outreach; revising CDC’s epidemiological questionnaire, Ebola Viral Disease Case Information 
Form, to include specific questions regarding direct contact with pets, livestock, and wildlife; 
developing an Ebola livestock response plan, particularly focused on swine; providing technical 
guidance to US government employees regarding occupational safety and health around 
bushmeat, pigs and pig meat; developing occupational guidelines for personal protective 
equipment (PPE) for US government field employees; and identifying animal-related diagnostic 
and research needs for EVD. A list of WG response activities is provided in Table 4.1. The list 
does not include the multitude of multidisciplinary and interagency communications, meetings, 
and logistical coordination activities that are necessary to construct and maintain the outbreak 
response infrastructure during One Health events. Peak activity for the WG occurred for 
approximately two months in the fall of 2014 during the height of the EVD outbreak in the US.  
Feasibility of One Health Systems Thinking  
For purposes of this paper, the evaluation of feasibility of the One Health approach refers 
to the degree of integration of One Health systems thinking into the USDA infrastructure. The 
One Health approach has been successfully implemented for a number of zoonotic and emerging 
diseases, including rabies, West Nile virus, Nipah, and many of foodborne bacterial pathogens 
such as Salmonella and Campylobacter (Monath et al., 2010; Rabinowitz et al., 2013). High 
pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 outbreak in 2004 is perhaps an exemplar of an 
international, integrated One Health approach in action (Gibbs, 2014; Leischow et al., 2008). 
Through these disease outbreaks, it has become apparent that zoonotic, trans-boundary diseases 
are complex, multilayered challenges that require a wide array of disciplines and fields,   
TABLE 4.1 











▪ Canine Quarantine Protocol 
▪ Outreach information on Ebola and pets and other animals for the public via CDC website  
▪ USDA APHIS VS Ebola Virus Disease Livestock Response Plan 
▪ Companion animal confinement and quarantine plans 
- Interim Guidance for Public Health Officials for Ebola Contacts with Pets 
- Interim Protocol for dog or Cat Confinement after Exposure to a Human with     
Confirmed Ebola Virus Infection 
▪ Factsheet regarding Ebola and wildlife intended for use in zoos and other similar 
establishments   










 ▪ PPE guidance documents for US government employees and other animal health personnel 
▪ Technical guidance to US government employees regarding occupational safety and health and 
contact  with bushmeat, pigs, and pig meat 
▪ Outreach materials to the public regarding Ebola transmission 
▪ Outreach materials to the public regarding the health risks and illegality of bushmeat 
▪ Revision of CDC’s epidemiological questionnaire, Ebola Virus Disease Case Information 



























▪ Animal diagnostic testing protocols and capabilities 
▪ Ebola-related import policies for animals, animal (by-) products, and animal research samples 
▪ Animal-related EVD research needs, including further studies of the epidemiology of Ebola in 
domesticated species and validation of diagnostic testing in domesticated species 
▪ Emergency management and occupational safety training for US government employees 
▪ Responses to Congressional inquiries for animal-related Ebola information 
▪ Responses to international requests for information  
▪ Regular situational reports for the White House and USDA agencies 
▪ Decision Memorandums, information Memorandums, briefings, and talking points for USDA 
leadership 
▪ Presentations at scientific meetings and conferences for industry and stakeholders  
 
  
including shared surveillance, diagnostic, and research networks as well as communication and 
informatics infrastructures so that governments and organizations can prepare and respond 
effectively (Leischow et al., 2008).  
Systems thinking is the idea that complex problems are best solved by considering the 
non-linear relationships and feedback loops between the components that make up the whole 
(Zinsstag et al., 2011). Working in isolation or within single-sector silos is less effective than 
creating integrated frameworks in which all the parts can be considered together. Systems 
thinking emphasize knowledge-sharing across disciplines; network-centric thinking that 
encourages relationship-building across disciplines and across organizations; and systems 
(re)organizing to foster improvements in organizational structures and functions (Leischow et al., 
2008).  
The One Health approach embodies systems thinking. However, integrated One Health 
frameworks cannot be implemented overnight; thus, creating the organizational infrastructure 
with strong cross-sectoral relationships takes time and resources and must be well-established 
before disease events occur. Making the paradigm shift from a reductionist approach to a more 
holistic, network-centric approach takes trial-and-error with real-life scenarios. Without a 
validated evaluation method for systems thinking approaches, outbreak events are often the only 
means to evaluate how well these systems are working and to illuminate vulnerabilities in the 
system. 
For the EVD outbreak in the US, several key components of the systems thinking 
approach for One Health were in place at the USDA level. For example, USDA has the One 
Health Coordination Center (OHCC) within USDA, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service 
(APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) which provides US leadership for the animal health 
component of One Health (USDA APHIS, 2014). Additionally, the One Health vision and its 
principles have been incorporated into strategic plans and the organizational structure (USDA 
APHIS, 2015). USDA has committed to collaborating with both internal and external partners, 
including entities that encompass human, animal and environment health such as federal agency 
partners, international organizations, non-government organizations, industry stakeholders, and 
academic institutions. Inter-departmental liaison positions for One Health-related issues are 
present including an OHCC liaison position within the CDC. Additionally, many US government 
departments, including USDA, have committed to the Global Health Security agenda which 
partners with other nations and international organizations to prevent, detect and respond to 
disease outbreaks that affect the global community (DHHS, 2015). Thus, USDA has the 
infrastructure and the network connections, internally and externally as well as domestically and 
internationally to make the systems thinking approach a feasible mechanism for addressing One 
Health events.  
However, the EVD outbreak uncovered several vulnerabilities to the One Health 
approach. Because the role of animals in the epidemiology of EVD has yet to be defined and its 
appearance in the US was unprecedented, there was initial uncertainty as to the role USDA and 
APHIS VS OHCC should play in the animal health response. Foreign animal diseases such as 
foot-and-mouth disease or avian influenza have very distinct federal response plans that have 
been practiced and executed; thus, inter-agency and intra-agency roles and responsibilities are 
defined. In contrast, EVD presented a gray area for leadership. This was further compounded by 
its high profile nature in the media and sensitivities by the Department, agricultural industries, 
and others to avoid misinformation to the public about the role of livestock, particularly pigs, 
which, like H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, could potentially undermine customer confidence 
in pork products and economically depress pork producers. Leadership and coordination of tasks 
of the WG was eventually shared between APHIS VS OHCC at the agency level and the USDA 
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Coordination (OHSEC) at the departmental level. 
Communications, both external and internal to the department, and coordination of technical 
guidance documents were funneled through the WG to maintain consistency of the USDA 
position and messaging.  
Other vulnerabilities were identified in informatic systems, including the efficacy of 
information technology (IT) tools and information sharing. Network securities and computer 
firewalls limited access to web applications such as SharePoint, making it difficult for WG 
members external to USDA to access reports and technical documents. Distribution of 
information to the WG was primarily through email distribution lists; however, the IT system 
protocols to add members to the WG email distribution list was slow and inconsistent, often 
taking days to complete requests. With the EVD situation changing daily, sometimes hourly, this 
meant that vital information was not reaching WG personnel in a timely manner, potentially 
hindering EVD response activities. Because this was a multi-agency approach, clearance of 
technical documents and guidance had to go through the approval process of multiple agencies 
and departments. This can be a laborious bureaucratic process in a single-sector approach; in the 
One Health approach, it is further compounded by multiple agency level and departmental 
approval processes, often performed in sequence rather than simultaneously. The sluggish flow 
of information stifled both inter-agency and intra-agency communication efforts. Lastly, because 
of the sheer size of the US government, it was difficult to track all the EVD response activities. 
This was particularly apparent in the development of PPE technical guidance. Several US 
government departments and agencies as well as non-government organizations and industries 
were concerned about PPE for employees; thus, multiple efforts to provide PPE guidance for 
EVD were occurring simultaneously. To avoid duplicate efforts and inconsistent or conflicting 
guidance, it was important to identify the key players and subject matter experts to ensure open, 
frequent communication for coordination of tasks. 
Multi-Disciplinary Integration of the USDA One Health Approach 
A comprehensive One Health approach integrates animal, human, and environmental 
health and considers communication and collaboration functions among all 3 sectors into the 
system infrastructure. Multi-disciplinary integration refers to the extent to which all three 
components were included into the One Health response efforts. For the USDA WG, 
multidisciplinary integration was good with several key components of One Health present. 
Because this was USDA-led effort, animal health for livestock was well-represented on the WG 
by numerous APHIS VS personnel with expertise in various livestock issues. Animal health for 
companion animals, including exotic pets such as pot-bellied pigs and nonhuman primates, was 
represented to a much smaller degree primarily through indirect efforts and communications 
through CDC and AVMA. Human health, or more specifically public health, was represented by 
various facets of USDA and Department of Health and Human Services. The Food Safety 
Inspection Service (FSIS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and liaison representation 
for United States Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) port 
inspectors provided subject matter experts and dedicated liaisons to the WG to cover issues that 
affect both US government employees that may potentially handle EVD-exposed livestock or 
bushmeat and for public health concerns surrounding bushmeat and the consumption of pork. 
Additionally, in conjunction with CDC, the WG addressed public health messaging to the 
general public regarding the health concerns of bushmeat and the illegality of bringing bushmeat 
into the United States. For environmental health, limited representation within the WG was 
present for wildlife and zoo animals through the APHIS units of Wildlife Services and Animal 
Care. It’s important to note that several agencies or offices within the WG provided input across 
both multiple sectors of animal, human and environmental health.   
Several One Health components within the WG were underrepresented or absent. 
Although the WG had access to government regulatory environmental agencies, namely the 
Environmental Protection Agency, field and epidemiological components of environmental 
health were limited. Although EVD transmission for this outbreak was primarily human-to-
human, technical expertise from environmental health professionals could augment response 
plans and research priorities. For human health, the clinical practice (i.e., physicians and 
representation by the AMA) component for human medicine was absent from the WG. This was 
likely due to the overwhelming need for physicians and human health organizations to be 
focused on the human aspects (prevention of spread, treatment protocols, hospital preparedness, 
etc.) of the EVD outbreak. Additionally, input from biomedical researchers from the human 
medicine side for potential research collaborations at the human-animal-environment interface 
was limited. Many of the limitations of One Health integration in the WG stem from the origins 
of the efforts; namely, as an internal task force within USDA to address animal health issues 
around EVD. The WG had to rely on pre-existing relationships and networks to get 
multidisciplinary and multiagency integration and representation. Additionally, representation 
and integration of One Health components were limited by the authoritarian power of federal 
agencies and offices
3
, conflicting resources and agendas, and the availability and necessity of 
volunteer representation for the WG.  
Benefits of the One Health Approach to EVD 
The fundamental goal of the One Health approach is to improve the overall health and 
well-being of animals, humans, and the environment. One Health is based on the systems 
thinking that holistic consideration of the interactions of the individual parts leads to better 
understanding and improvement of whole health. Thus, tangible benefits from the USDA WG 
could provide validity for the One Health approach at the federal level. Several key outcomes 
from the One Health approach lend credence to this. First, the collaborative efforts to quarantine 
the dog of the first infected healthcare provider saved the life of that dog and future companion 
animals that may have contact with EVD-infected humans. Furthermore, in developed nations 
where the human-animal bond is strong and companion animals are considered members of the 
family, the creation and implementation of the Canine Quarantine Protocol avoided public outcry 
and helped to maintain public confidence in the EVD outbreak response. Secondly, animal health 
input into CDC’s epidemiological questionnaire, entitled Ebola Virus Case Investigation Form, 
provided a means to evaluate any direct link between human EVD contacts and animals. The 
questionnaire was expanded from inquiring solely about pets (dogs and cats) to including 
questions that asked about contacts with livestock, wildlife, and other animals. This strengthened 
cross-sectoral communications and collaborations, ensuring that animal health officials at the 
local, state and federal levels are notified at the earliest indication that animal exposure of any 
kind has occurred. Thirdly, the WG identified animal-related research needs for EVD. In 
particular, further research is needed to confirm natural reservoir hosts and to understand the 
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 For example, USDA APHIS has authority over livestock health and protecting agricultural resources from wildlife 
damage while CDC has authority over companion animals, specifically communicable human diseases related to the 
importation and movement of dogs, nonhuman primates, and some reptiles. 
epidemiological role of animals, particularly pigs. Animal health input into research needs is 
important as resources are limited and collaborative efforts can be economically beneficial when 
research funding and laboratory resources (i.e., accessibility to biosafety level 4 labs) are scarce. 
Lastly, many of the EVD response activities by the WG were preparatory efforts for future EVD 
outbreaks and similar zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases. It strengthened existing 
response frameworks by encouraging the WG to review current networks and protocols. For 
example, the EVD outbreak elicited renewed discussion among the WG about the public and 
animal health concerns of imported, illegal bushmeat. It prompted a thorough review of current 
PPE protocols and the national veterinary stockpile capabilities for foreign animal diseases; both 
deemed to be appropriate and applicable to an EVD outbreak involving animal species. Most 
importantly, the EVD outbreak stretched our thinking beyond the standard, everyday regulatory 
diseases of animal health (i.e., bovine tuberculosis, avian influenza, BSE, and others) toward the 
ever-increasing occurrences of emerging infectious diseases where epidemiological knowledge is 
incomplete and the lines between the human-animal-environment interface are blurred.  
Discussion 
The 2014 EVD outbreak in the US tested the One Health infrastructure at the federal 
level for animal health. It confirmed that USDA has the infrastructure and the network 
connections to make the systems thinking approach a feasible mechanism for addressing One 
Health events. However, gaps exist for clearly defined roles and responsibilities for leadership 
and participatory players and the efficacy of IT tools and information-sharing systems need 
improvement to better accommodate a network-centric, multi-disciplinary system that can keep 
pace with rapidly-changing disease outbreak situations. The EVD outbreak highlighted the 
degree of integration of animal, human, and environmental health disciplines. Understandably, 
animal health was well-represented within the USDA WG and animal health issues for livestock 
and companion animals were well covered. For human health, the clinical practice component of 
human medicine was largely absent and aspects of environmental health were absent or 
underrepresented. Despite these shortfalls, the One Health approach proved to be advantageous 
both for USDA as well as for overall (animal) health. It provided technical support and guidance 
for the Canine Quarantine Protocol, directly affecting the health outcome of the dog of the 
infected healthcare worker and future companion animals of infected patients. It created new 
collaborative networks and strengthened existing network relationships across animal and public 
health. It encouraged preparatory efforts for the next emerging infectious disease event, 
stretching the traditional views and constructs of USDA’s role in One Health events and better 
preparing the Department and its agencies for the next EVD or similar outbreak. 
  
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The One Health approach to zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases has historical 
roots dating back to the 19
th
 century. It is an evolving concept that has experienced a recent 
resurgence. Although a wide-ranging commitment to One Health has been achieved, the 
translation of ideas into practical use has been challenging. Professions are siloed and some are 
skeptical of a holistic approach; thus, integration across some disciplines has been slow. The lack 
of operationalization of One Health may be due to its broad definition, making it difficult to 
articulate the One Health agenda and identify specific actions. Most examples of One Health 
successes and funding have been tied to specific diseases (i.e., avian influenza), making it 
difficult to identify effective ways to support the interdisciplinary nature of One Health in the 
absence of a specific disease focus and in times when resources are scarce (Gibbs, 2014). Also, 
evaluation methods for validation of the One Health approach are limited. Large, controlled 
studies on One Health disease prediction, control, and intervention strategies using shared 
surveillance data and economic cost-benefit analyses may provide quantitative evidence for One 
Health systems thinking and may help push One Health into the mainstream (Gibbs, 2014; 
Rushton, Hasler, De Haan, & Rushton, 2012).  
It is not a matter of “if” but rather “when” the next zoonotic or emerging infectious 
disease will occur in the United States. Several key recommendations have been made to better 
prepare for future One Health events. An educated public health workforce is vital to providing 
well-trained professionals and able leadership. Many veterinary and medical schools are already 
offering dual-degree programs in (veterinary) public health (Howell, Hamilton, New, Lane, & 
Brace, 2008). Many have suggested that schools of public health as well as veterinary and 
medical schools should offer master’s and doctoral level degree programs in One Health (Kahn, 
2011). Students and existing professionals in healthcare specialties, including animal, human, 
and environmental health, need training in multidisciplinary approaches to emerging infectious 
diseases, comparative medicine and biomedical research, public health, global food safety and 
security, and ecosystem and environmental health. Educating professionals as well as the general 
public about One Health methods and benefits can help to further permeate the concepts towards 
universal recognition and acceptance (Dhama et al., 2013; Gibbs & Gibbs, 2013; Gibbs, 2014; 
Mazet et al., 2009).  
Continued communication and collaborations must occur between veterinarians, 
physicians, and environmental health professionals regarding animal, human, and wildlife health. 
This can be accomplished, for example, through jointly sponsored veterinary and medical 
conferences on zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases or through cross-sectoral liaison 
positions (i.e., veterinarians in public health offices), bringing together local, State and federal 
counterparts of animal and public health. Also, integrated, trans-boundary surveillance systems 
across species can bring together participants from diverse scientific backgrounds and help to 
identify infectious disease risks to human and animal populations (Dhama et al., 2013; 
Rabinowitz et al., 2013). Fostering relationships across disciplines leads to a network-centric 
culture and (re)organization of traditional infrastructures towards One Health systems thinking, 
creating opportunities for collaborative, cooperative and coordinated efforts during One Health 
events. Interactions that help to build relationships and collaborative networks can help to ensure 
a more rapid response to zoonotic and emerging infectious disease outbreaks (Kahn et al., 2007). 
 
Many propose that veterinarians are best suited to lead the One Health movement. Much 
of the impetus for One Health has come from the animal health side with veterinarians, 
academia, governments, and international organizations demonstrating the strongest commitment 
to the approach (Burns, 2012; Lee & Brumme, 2013). Veterinarians are educated in multiple 
species, comparative medicine, and herd health with a focus on protecting and improving both 
animal and human health. They have an in-depth, herd-level understanding of biological 
systems, disease pathology and epidemiology, diagnostic methods, and treatment and disease 
management protocols for infectious diseases. Through their education and vocation, they have a 
fundamental connection to food animals and food safety, often coming in contact with a wide 
variety of domestic and wild animals and often with established networks to regional and 
national diagnostic laboratory systems and local and national regulatory systems for animal 
health, food safety, and public health. Because of this, veterinarians are well poised to provide 
the bridge between animal, human, and environmental health (Kahn et al., 2007; Osburn et al., 
2009).  
As the agency with authority over the protection and promotion of animal health, USDA 
APHIS is in the strategic position to continue to lead the One Health movement at the federal 
level. USDA APHIS has begun integrating One Health systems thinking into its infrastructure 
and it has the educated workforce in both veterinary medicine and public health that is needed to 
provide precise leadership and strong staff support. The agency has established network 
relationships with various sectors of One Health, including animal health, food safety, wildlife 
health, and public health. The One Health approach from the animal health perspective proved to 
be an appropriate strategy for responding to the EVD outbreak in the United States. With 
continued integration of One Health principles and implementation of  flexible, cross-sectoral 
networking and governance, current and future challenges – bioterrorism, antimicrobial drug 
resistance, climate change, or the yet to be discovered zoonotic and emerging infectious diseases 
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